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Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
WITTGENSTEIN AND LEAVIS:  
LITERATURE AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE ETHICAL
Abstract. For Wittgenstein, ethics cannot be put into words. This does 
not mean he thought ethics cannot be made manifest; indeed, he took 
the best manifestation of ethics to occur in aesthetics, and more spe-
cifically in literature. Wittgenstein takes us some way toward fleshing 
out literature’s “perspicuous presentations,” but not far enough. To do 
this, I appeal to F. R. Leavis’s notion of enactment and his view of the 
autonomous, active role of language in literature. I conclude that for 
both, the meaning of literature’s ethical enactments is determined not 
subjectively but intersubjectively. Literature imposes, and not merely 
proposes, ethical meaning.
Shakespeare displays the dance of human passions, one might 
say. . . . But he displays it to us in a dance, not naturalistically.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein1
In the TracTaTus, Wittgenstein says that ethics cannot be put into words. This does not mean he thought ethics could not be made 
manifest; and indeed I will suggest that Wittgenstein took the best mani-
festation of ethics to be in aesthetics, and more specifically literature. 
Literature uses words in such a way as to allow ethics to show itself. It 
does this, I suggest, through perspicuous presentations, though of a dif-
ferent kind than those of philosophy. Wittgenstein takes us some way 
toward fleshing out the literary nature of perspicuous presentations, but 
not far enough. To do this, I will appeal to a literary critic: F. R. Leavis.
For those who don’t know Leavis, he is considered by many—myself 
included—the best literary critic of our time. He knew Wittgenstein 
personally, invited him to his home, went on boat trips with him, and 
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wrote a chapter recording their relationship in which he says that they 
never discussed philosophy and that he found Wittgenstein’s interest 
in literature to be “rudimentary.”2 This, however, did not stop Leavis 
from affirming his “very positive sense of the nature of [Wittgenstein’s] 
genius” (CAP, p. 143). Still, I don’t believe they knew how much they 
shared: their common stance on the importance of language, the dif-
ference between saying and showing, the necessary contextualization of 
meaning; the fundamental importance of the nonpropositional and 
the exaggerated importance of the propositional in our accounts of 
human life and thought. Neither Wittgenstein nor Leavis believed that 
true and false statements were the crucial constituents in our accounts 
and expressions of human life and thought.
Oddly enough, literature prompted my interest in Wittgenstein. The 
question I wanted philosophy to answer was: what is the great thing 
about literature? Why are we drawn to it? My immediate answer was 
similar to Aristotle’s and Kant’s: cognitive pleasure. But the problem with 
cognition—knowledge—is that it’s too analytic. Knowledge—justified 
true belief—was not what I was looking for. The kind of cognition that 
literature affords us is not of the order of strict justification and veridical 
correspondence to reality but of a more fundamental and indubitable 
certainty. I then got my hands on a book of Wittgenstein’s that had 
received very little attention: On Certainty. And this is where I found the 
genius that Leavis was talking about.
The kind of certainty Wittgenstein delineates in that work is one 
that is more fundamental than knowledge, that underpins it; that is not 
susceptible of proof or verification because it is more fundamental even 
than those. This certainty, I thought, is what literature gives us; this is 
how it contributes to the formation of our concepts, our emotions, and 
generally of our being human. And this, I then found, was very close to 
the “certitude” Leavis talks about in The Critic as Anti-Philosopher:
[The rare real critic] knows that, in the nature of things, he can’t attain to 
the completeness that is finality, and some of his certitudes may be insuf-
ficiently grounded. But . . . the nearest the perceptively thinking individual 
gets to the certainty that he is grasping in direct possession significance 
itself, unmediated, is in the certitude that he has taken possession of the 
basic major perceptions, intuitions and realizations communicated with 
consummate delicacy to the reader in the mastering of the creative work 
of a great writer. Such certitude of possession is an ultimate; what could 
a proof, if proof were possible, add to it? (CAP, p. 192)
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Leavis’s contention, here as elsewhere, that “finality” is in some cases 
unattainable does not contradict ultimate certitude of possession; for whereas 
“finality” or “completeness” is the result of “proof” or “grounding,” ulti-
mate “certitude” is groundless: “it is characteristic of the most important 
convictions one forms to admit of nothing like proof”; the “rightness” of 
the judgment, he writes elsewhere, “stands clear for . . . recognition—it 
makes itself, needing no assertion.”3 The parallel with Wittgenstein is strik-
ing, not only in the notion of a nonpropositional certainty but also in 
the Wittgensteinian dichotomy between showing and saying, where—in 
some cases—meaning cannot be said or asserted, but can only show itself; 
the showing being done through words and deeds. This is reminiscent of 
Leavis’s conception of enactment or presentment, to which I will return 
after giving a brief account of Wittgenstein on ethics and aesthetics.
I
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein famously writes: “Ethics and aesthetics 
are one.”4 This is ambiguous. It can mean that ethics and aesthetics are 
the same thing; there is no differentiating them at all—so that we could 
use the words “ethics” and “aesthetics” interchangeably. It is unlikely 
that this is what Wittgenstein means, for he himself does not use the 
terms interchangeably. I think the two following interpretations are 
more likely: (1) that ethics and aesthetics are very similar; they share 
important features; and (2) that aesthetics is internally connected to 
ethics: that we cannot speak of aesthetics without it engaging ethics.5
In fact Leavis holds the latter view, at least as concerns literature—
great literature, that is: it is necessarily ethical. Iris Murdoch, Martha 
Nussbaum, Cora Diamond, and Matthew Kieran hold variants of this 
view, which might be summed up, in Kieran’s words, as the belief that 
there is “an inherent link between what is represented artistically and 
moral understanding”6—where “artistically” here is not merely a clas-
sificatory but an evaluative term.
Wittgenstein, as is characteristic of him, never develops an explicit 
aesthetic theory, but this does not prevent him from having clear views 
on the matter. He first makes the connection between ethics and aes-
thetics—or art—in the Notebooks, where he writes: “For there is certainly 
something in the conception that the end of art is the beautiful. And the 
beautiful is what makes happy.”7 The words “beautiful” and “happy” are to 
be associated with the aesthetic and the ethical respectively: “the beauti-
ful” being another term for “the aesthetic,” and—since Aristotle—does 
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not denote what is aesthetically pleasing in the ordinary sense, but in a 
broader sense, which includes artistic representations of ugly or repul-
sive objects (as, for example, Soutine’s paintings of carcasses). As for 
“happy,” this is associated with the ethical, also since Aristotle, for whom 
happiness or “the good life” is the highest good, the ultimate pursuit 
(end/good/goal) of an ethical life.8 And so the passage I’ve just read 
is a laconic formulation, and indeed endorsement, of the view of art as 
internally connected to the good life, happiness, ethics.9 Art makes us 
happy; that is, it puts us in the world of the happy; the ethical world. 
The artist, writes Wittgenstein, “looks at the world with a happy eye” 
(NB, p. 86), by which, we now understand “an ethical eye.”10
But how does the artist do this? The moral significance of aesthetics for 
the Tractarian Wittgenstein lies in the artist’s ability to present objects, 
not as they exist in the empirical world but sub specie aeternitatis11—that 
is: atemporally or noncontingently; essentially.12 Whereas the “usual way 
of looking at things sees objects . . . from the midst of them,” the artist 
views them from outside, with Künstlerische Wunder (aesthetic wonder). 
And this means that she views them ethically; that is, with the kind of 
detachment that contemplates not facts, but the fact of existence. In 
the Notebooks: “Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists [Das 
künstlerische Wunder ist, daß es die Welt gibt]. That there is what there is” 
(NB, p. 86).
Now the world the artist sees is not factually different from the world 
of the ordinary man; it is his attitude toward, his perspective of, that 
world that is different and transformative. For Wittgenstein, a kind of 
Gestalt switch takes place in artistic contemplation: where we “usually” 
see “the bare present image” as a “worthless momentary picture in the 
whole temporal world,” the artist in künstlerische Wunder sees it as “the 
true world among shadows.”13 It is the same bare, present world, for 
nothing has been added or removed from it, and yet an altogether 
different world, where the contingent and temporal fade out to allow 
the atemporal significance to emerge. Here is a passage from Culture 
and Value:
Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing a man who thinks he is 
unobserved performing some quite simple everyday activity. . . . [This is] 
something more wonderful than anything a playwright could arrange to 
be acted or spoken on the stage: life itself. —But then we do see this every 
day without its making the slightest impression on us! True enough, but 
we do not see it from that point of view. . . . Only an artist can represent 
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an individual thing as to make it appear to us like a work of art. . . . A 
work of art forces us—as one might say—to see it in the right perspective 
but, in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other.  
. . . (CV, pp. 4–5; my italics)
And so the very same thing that had not otherwise made an impres-
sion on us will make one when presented from an artistic perspective. 
This brings to mind Wittgenstein’s notion of a “perspicuous presenta-
tion”—whereby something that had always been in plain view, and yet 
overlooked by us, when properly arranged (perspicuously presented) 
is brought to our attention and strikes us significantly and as never 
before. A work of art, that is, a presentation of the world seen through the eye 
of an artist—an aesthetic “presentation”—forces us to see the world, as 
Wittgenstein says, in the right perspective, with a happy or an ethical eye. 
Artistic contemplation endows objects and the world with significance. 
This, then, on Wittgenstein’s view, is what art does; and we learn from 
it: “People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, 
musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something 
to teach them—that does not occur to them” (CV, p. 36).
For Leavis, too: “by the study of the precisions created by poetic genius 
we advance our knowledge of ourselves”; and yet, there is no stating the 
effect on us of poetic precision “explicitly in direct articulate speech.”14 
This takes us back to Wittgenstein’s remarks about the impossibility 
of putting ethics into words: “it is impossible for there to be proposi-
tions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher” (TLP 
6.42). The noncontingency of the sense of the world, of ethics, makes it 
unamenable to propositionality. Propositions are the means of expres-
sion of the empirical, not of the ethical—of what can be true or false, 
not of what is higher.
And so ethics cannot be put in propositions; cannot, that  is, be said:15 
yet it is not, for all that, relegated to obscurity. For the Tractatus tells us 
that what cannot be put into words can nevertheless show itself: “There 
are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest” (TLP 6.522). And they do so particularly well in literature16—
as Wittgenstein himself indicates in a letter to Paul Engelmann: “The 
poem by Uhland is really magnificent. And this is how it is: if only you 
do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the 
unutterable will be—unutterably—contained in what has been uttered.”17
Engelmann’s gloss on this is: “Wittgenstein passionately believes that 
all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we 
must be silent about” (EL, p. 97). And as these passages make clear, 
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silence here does not mean not using words. The poem does not achieve 
its effect by what it says, but by what its words evoke or show or make 
manifest—and that cannot be said: “What expresses itself in language, 
we cannot express by means of language,” writes Wittgenstein (TLP 
4.121). But how does something express itself in language, without it 
being us expressing it? To begin answering this question, we must briefly 
remember how language works.
II
Practice gives the words their sense.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein (CV, p. 85)
We have seen that both Leavis and Wittgenstein take literature to 
be advancing our knowledge of ourselves; but we have also seen that 
it is not any empirical or naturalistic knowledge that is being advanced 
here. The heuristic role played by literature in our lives is not empiri-
cal, referential, or even epistemic. As Bernard Harrison succinctly puts 
it: “The notions of reference and truth have no coherent application 
in literature”; “The place to look for Great Truths is not in a novel but 
in a physics text.”18
But if the notions of reference and truth have no coherent applica-
tion in literature, how can we retain any grip on the idea that literature 
has something to teach us about ourselves; that is, about reality? Well, 
correspondence, truth, and reference are not the only ways literature 
can attach to reality. Whereas science formulates true statements con-
cerning reality and the presentation of evidence for the truth or falsity 
of such statements, the distinguishing feature of literature or creative 
language is that it does not use words to illuminate reality by referring to 
it, by representing it, by offering us general and transcendental truths; it uses 
words to illuminate words, and through illuminating words, illuminate 
and impact our practices, us (IF, p. 57).
For, as Wittgenstein makes clear, language gets its meaning from our 
practices. But whereas some of our practices merely place the natural 
world in relationship with language (giving us, for example, biological 
taxonomy), other practices develop from “very general facts of nature,”19 
including basic human behavior (“Our language-game is an extension 
of primitive behaviour”20); and some practices actually create human 
worlds through language. The civil, political, religious, economic forms 
of life, for instance, are dependent on language for their creation and 
maintenance.
246 Philosophy and Literature
This means that our language is inextricably bound up with, not 
only organizing our world but also transforming and making us what 
we are. No need for correspondence, there is here an internal connec-
tion between language and human reality. As Harrison reminds us: 
“Language is everywhere hopelessly infected by the extra-linguistic: the 
relationships between its signs run ineluctably by way of the world. So 
there is . . . a strong connection between language and Reality; only it 
does not run by way of referentiality and truth” (IF, p. 51).
Language is inherently—and not inferentially—permeated by the 
reality of human worlds; and language, being of course the writer’s tool, 
it is from this “reality-soaked” language (Harrison’s expression: IF, p. 
58) that literature draws its breath and its meaning. Leavis agrees with 
this. He speaks of language as a collaborative achievement21 that, we 
might say, is soaked in “immemorial human living”: “more than a means 
of expression; [language] is the heuristic conquest won out of repre-
sentative experience, the upshot or precipitate of immemorial human 
living, and embodies values, distinctions, identifications, conclusions 
. . . and tested potentialities” (LP, pp. 42–44). And inasmuch as, for Leavis, 
“the fullest use of language is to be found in creative literature” (CAP, 
p. 143), creative literature advances the frontiers of language and, 
thereby, of our understanding of ourselves. For Leavis, a creative work 
of literature is both a product and a mover of language—language 
conceived as more than a means of description and more than a 
means of expression; language as invested with, carrying, and in great 
part constituting human culture. The work of literature is, then, as he 
says, the product of “the interplay between the living language and the 
creativity of individual genius” (LP, p. 49). For if language carries and 
constitutes a great part of our humanity, it should come as no surprise 
that it, and not only the author, plays an active role in the determina-
tion of a work’s meaning.
III
“Thank God, I am not free any more than a rooted tree is 
free”: that is the utterance of a great artist.
—F. R. Leavis22
Although Leavis sees the quality of genius as distinctive and intensely 
individual, his view of language as “collaborative creativity” entails the 
essentially collaborative nature of literary creation itself (LP, p. 36). This 
is why the poem does not belong to its maker, but is rather “the creative 
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product of something other than ego and will”; its author having drawn 
freely, for creativity, “on the deep-lying source”23 (TWC, pp. 72–73). 
So that every significant artist can make “the claim that is genuinely a 
disclaimer”; he “can say, with Blake, of the creative works he produces: 
‘Though I call them mine, I know that they are not mine.’”24
This signals the imposing presence of language and, with it, that 
of reality. The work’s near independence from its author recalls the 
Romantic notion of poet as a passive Aeolian harp through which the 
wind of inspiration blows:25 “Not I,—says D.H. Lawrence—but the wind 
that blows through me.”26 Yet it is not the passivity of the artist that I 
want to stress here, but the active contribution of language itself in the 
determination of meaning—something Harrison superbly describes in 
a paper subtitled “The Limits of Authorial Licence”:
[T]he need to put down some words on a blank page, marks not the 
point at which the writer enters into the full play of authorial licence, but, 
paradoxically, the point at which authorial licence begins to encounter 
limits. Neither language nor the vast web of practices which supply roles, 
and hence meanings, to its words are, after all, either the property or the 
inventions of the author. They are public property: the framework of a 
culture and a world—or, better, system of worlds—which he found ready-
made when he entered it at birth, and which will long outlast him. Plot, 
genre, local colour, choice of characters and relationships, all these are in 
the unimpeded gift of the author. But ultimately characters must be made 
to speak, words must be deployed upon a page. It is then that the going 
begins to get sticky; then that human reality begins to reclaim her own.27
The idea here is not to depersonalize or “kill” the author. Of course, 
writers are the writers they are because of the individuals they are, but 
not only. The disconnect is in the active, and at times irrepressible, role 
of language in their writing.28 The art of creation and the pressure of 
the imagined situations, along with what Wittgenstein calls the autonomy 
of grammar, generate an autonomous force. Grammar, in his sense, 
is the reality-soaked set of conditions or rules that governs the use of 
our words. It is because words are “reality-soaked” that they are not the 
propriety of a writer; that they can be “interrogated” rather than merely 
manipulated.29 Words offer more resistance than pliancy; and it is in 
this reality-impregnated resistance that they, in context, reveal the limits 
and possibilities of their meanings, and thereby ours.30
Whereas the dictionary serves as a quick reference tool for the gen-
eral uses of a word, interrogating words requires trying them, testing 
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them against one another, and in so doing testing the concepts they 
express. This is how Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend investigates some of 
the moral ambiguities surrounding such phrases as “bettering oneself” 
and “getting on in the world”; and how Madame Bovary helps constitute 
the meaning of ennui.
In a literary work, the limits of our ordinary conceptual vocabulary 
are pushed; we are made to grasp the revitalized sense—or indeed a new 
sense—in which a human being may be said to have dignity or honor, 
or to be bored. Because, as Harrison writes, our words are rooted in 
our practices, because they are the signs and tools of these practices, 
in interrogating words, and beyond them the practices they articulate, 
serve, or constitute, both writer and reader interrogate things central 
and foundational to their concrete humanity (WFF, pp. 261–72).
But literature is not a mere battle of words; words, as we know, have 
meaning only in context, and literature provides these: it sets language 
in motion, in the context of imagined situations, in ways that make the 
reader attentive to the nature and implications of the practices rooted 
in those words.
IV
As Raimond Gaita reminds us, the most fundamental point of 
Wittgenstein’s legacy is that we cannot purify our concepts of their 
embeddedness in human life without being left with only a shadow 
play of the grammar of serious judgment.31 Indeed, Wittgenstein was 
instrumental in getting us to see that it is not in propositions that many 
of our psychological, moral, and aesthetic meanings and beliefs are 
embedded and deployed but in action32 (that is, in what we do and in 
what we say), in the stream of life. He writes: “We can see from their 
actions that [people] believe certain things definitely, whether they 
express this belief or not”;33 “An expectation is embedded in [eingebettet] 
a situation from which it takes its rise” (Z §67). Here, people’s actions are 
not exterior signs of inner propositional beliefs; their actions constitute 
their beliefs. Another way of saying this is that their beliefs are enacted.
Like Wittgenstein,34 Leavis insists that we must fight the idea that 
only what can be stated clearly and logically is worthy of acceptance—
the most important things defy statement. But they do not defy what 
he calls “enactment”35 or “creative presentment,”36 which Wittgenstein 
called “showing”: “Nothing important can really be said simply—simply 
and safely; and by ‘safely’ I mean so as to ensure that the whole intuited 
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apprehension striving to find itself, to discover what it is in words, is duly 
served, and not thwarted. It takes a context, often a subtly and potently 
creative one, to do that” (TWC, p. 122).
This makes literature particularly congenial to the manifestation of 
“the important” (which certainly includes the ethical), in that litera-
ture’s use of language is attentively and subtly contextualized, and as 
far removed from what Leavis calls “the stating use”37 as language can 
get. As paradoxical as it may seem, literature does not say what it wants 
to transmit; it creates contexts and situations that allow the important 
things to show themselves. And that is not a straightforward affair, for 
meanings—as Wittgenstein makes clear—come embedded in “forms of 
life,” in “patterns of life,”38 and in the “stream of life.”
V
Under the pavement of interpretation lies the sand of natural 
reactions and direct understanding.
—Christiane Chauviré39
The essential embeddedness of meaning is why, as Leavis says, nothing 
important can really be said simply; why any significant penetration or 
“perspicuous presentation” of human concepts, emotions, values has 
also to be embedded—be it in a fictional life, a narrative, a story; that 
is, enacted. For Lawrence, writes Leavis, “thought [about the nature, 
the meaning and the essential problems of human life], to come at all 
near truth and adequacy, must engage the whole man, and relate [all 
the diverse elements of experience] in a valid way—such a way, that is, 
as precludes and defeats the distorting effects of abstraction and selec-
tion” (AK, p. 11). Because the novel is best equipped to orchestrate this 
embeddedness, Lawrence calls it “the highest form of human expression 
so far attained.”40 The novel is best at wielding the “subtle interrelated-
ness” by which “all things” contributing to meaning are given full play.41
This interrelatedness is best seen in the inseparable conjunction of 
form and content—that is, in the internal relation between how the 
work of art expresses and what it expresses.42 The meaning of a novel 
or in a novel cannot be prized apart from its form because the formal 
properties of the novel essentially contribute to its meaning. Try para-
phrasing Anna’s love, Emma’s ennui, or Iago’s ressentiment. You will 
be left, as Gaita says, with only the shadow play of those feelings and 
concepts. The novel’s impact on us is not to be found in the thoughts 
summarizing a work of fiction, or even in the very sentences of the 
250 Philosophy and Literature
work, but in the way those sentences are presented (e.g., as dialogue, 
narrative, description, etc.), and in the literary and nonliterary devices 
that bolster and contextualize them,43 intricately informing the novel’s 
“subtle interrelatedness.”
Having read the great novelists, we stand enriched—not by state-
ment, proof, or justification, but by the more “direct possession” that 
“showing” or enactment affords. Here is an example drawn by Harrison 
(WFF) from Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend. It is a minute example, but I 
like it because it is an enactment mis en abîme.44 The passage shows the 
young Charlie Hexam in his first encounter with Bradley Headstone, 
his ill-meaning, self-righteous schoolmaster:
“So you want to go and see your sister, Hexam?”
“If you please, Mr Headstone.”
“I have half a mind to go with you. Where does your sister live?”
“Why, she is not settled yet, Mr Headstone. I’d rather you didn’t see her 
till she is settled, if it was all the same to you.”
“Look, here, Hexam.” Mr Bradley Headstone, highly certificated stipendi-
ary schoolmaster, drew his right forefinger through one of the buttonholes 
of the boy’s coat, and looked at it attentively. “I hope your sister may be 
good company for you.”
“Why do you doubt it, Mr Headstone?”
“I didn’t say I doubted it.”
“No, sir; you didn’t say so.”(p. 201)
This is a tiny example of how works of art do not state but “enact 
their moral valuations,” as Leavis puts it (CP, p. 110). Thanks to the 
configuration created by Dickens in this short scene whose elements 
were anticipated and sustained by all that precedes it, we grasp the 
meaning of the exchange between the pupil and his master, and feel 
the shadow of an ill-meaning mind trying to extend itself over a child. 
No paraphrase or summary could convince us more intimately of what 
is meant here—and by “intimately” I mean nonpropositionally and non-
inferentially: the enactive imagination impacting, as Hutto and Myin put 
it, “before and below” the propositional.45 It is like grasping an aspect 
that emerges from a configuration. What Leavis calls the “irresistible 
immediacy” (GT, p. 204) of our aesthetic reactions leaves no room for 
ratiocinated judgment.
This is also Wittgenstein’s position. He articulates it clearly about 
music: “If a theme, a phrase, suddenly means something to you, you 
don’t have to be able to explain it. Just this gesture has been made 
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accessible to you” (Z §158); that is, you “understand it”46 (Z §159). And 
this is extended to literature: “A poet’s words can pierce us. And that is 
of course causally connected with the use that they have in our life” (Z 
§155). “Causally,” meaning here not via interpretation or explanation; 
for there is meaning that can be explained and meaning that does 
not come out in an explanation47 (Z §156). We can be impacted by, or 
“understand,” the words of a poem, directly, which means noninterpre-
tatively; for it speaks to us, writes Wittgenstein, “the way music speaks. 
Do not forget that a poem, although it is composed in the language of 
information, is not used in the language-game of giving information” 
(Z §160).
Meaning enacted in literature is grasped with what Chauviré calls 
our “spontaneous, immediate intelligence”48 (remembering, of course, 
that spontaneity can result from training); and such a grasp results in 
what Hutto calls “a nondiscursive form of embodied cognition” (RE, 
p. 5). This is the kind of cognition that requires no interpretation: we 
get the meaning or the point; we grasp it—the way we ordinarily grasp 
language, or the way we grasp emotion on a face:
“We see emotion.” As opposed to what? —We do not see facial contortions 
and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, 
grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, 
even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. 
—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to 
the concept of emotion. (Z §225)
Here now is another example of enactment in literature. In this scene 
from Anna Karenina, Anna alights the train where she has just seen the 
dashing Vronsky and heard his profession of love for her:
At Petersburg, as soon as the train stopped and she got out, the first person 
that attracted her attention was her husband. “Oh, mercy! why do his ears 
look like that?” she thought, looking at his frigid and imposing figure, 
and especially the ears that struck her at the moment as propping up the 
brim of his round hat. Catching sight of her, he came to meet her, his lips 
falling into their habitual sarcastic smile, and his big, tired eyes looking 
straight at her. An unpleasant sensation gripped at her heart when she 
met his obstinate and weary glance, as though she had expected to see 
him different. She was especially struck by the feeling of dissatisfaction 
with herself that she experienced on meeting him. That feeling was an 
intimate, familiar feeling, like a consciousness of hypocrisy, which she 
252 Philosophy and Literature
experienced in her relations with her husband. But hitherto she had not 
taken note of the feeling, now she was clearly and painfully aware of it.49
Karenin’s ears are the odd note—prompted, of course, by Anna hav-
ing just seen Vronsky—that catches and encapsulates the reality and 
evolution of her feelings for her husband and the turmoil within her. 
Her observation of her husband’s ears is Anna’s nascent realization of 
her feelings; and no mere statement of this realization could effectively 
replace this enactment (or, as we may also call it, particularly aptly in this 
case, embodiment). For though the narrator later in the passage begins to 
flesh out the meaning of the enactment, he merely gives explicitness to 
a significance that, as Leavis says, “we have already taken”; a significance 
that has already been “done in dramatic immediacy” (DHL, p. 172). 
What strikes the reader in an immediate way50 is the triviality of the 
detail that brings Anna to realization—her husband’s ears—and how 
this triviality must reflect the triviality of her feelings for him.
Through such sensitive and creative contextualizations and arrange-
ments of words, literature offers us the most perspicuous presentations of 
ourselves. If an immense amount of being human is present in what we 
do and say—such as in a contextualized look, gesture, or word—then 
literature is indeed best equipped to present the texture of being. As 
Cora Diamond puts it:
It is part of the concept of a human being that an immense amount of 
what being human is for us can be present in a look that passes between 
two people; it is part of the concept that all that can equally be denied 
in a look. Novelists and other writers can put before us and develop our 
concept of a human being by giving us scenes of such recognition or 
denial of recognition, by showing us, reminding us, that this is what it 
is like to recognize another human being, and that this is what it is like 
to fail to accord such recognition, to refuse it. [They] show us . . . the 
shape of certain possibilities in human life. Not to know what it is to look 
at another human being with such recognition or with its denial, not to 
know how that differs from what is possible with animals, is not to have 
as fully as one might and as one should the concept of a human being.51
Because the novel demands the dramatic presentment of embedded 
internal connections, and is therefore “incapable of the absolute,” it is, as 
Lawrence says, “a great discovery: far greater than Galileo’s telescope or 
somebody else’s wireless” (PHI, p. 418). By this, he means that—contrary 
to science, which breaks down the objects of its interest to analyzable 
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components—the novel is the antithesis of reduction; it is uniquely suited 
to make perspicuous presentations of wholes: dealing with experience 
as humans know it, in context and in all of its complexity, with strands 
of meaning running through in their relations with one another. Of 
course, other literary genres and other arts do this in various degrees, 
but none like the novel.
VI
The significance we look for in creative literature is a matter 
of the sense of life, the sense of the potentialities of human 
experience, it conveys.
—F. R. Leavis (CAP, p. 118)
This capacity for enactment, on Lawrence’s view, also makes the novel 
a great moral discovery, for it gives us what philosophy cannot: “a passion-
ate, implicit morality, not didactic. A morality which changes the blood, 
rather than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind follows later, 
in the wake.”52 The idea here is to deintellectualize morality, to get us 
to see it as an attitude, a way of being and acting; and to deintellectual-
ize, too, the moralizing process: morality reaches the mind through the 
blood—that is, through the immediacy of enactment.
For to say, as Leavis does, that “works of art enact their moral valuations” 
(CAP, pp. 110–11; my emphasis) is not to say that the author comes to 
the work with a moral agenda that she intends the work to dramatize. 
This, to Leavis and Lawrence, would be moralism, not morality. For Leavis, 
the moral in art should be a “deep spontaneous lived question” (AK, 
p. 12): “spontaneous” in that it should emerge from the work and not be 
put into it; “lived” in that it should be enacted; and a question in that 
it shouldn’t be a premeditated answer—for that would be prescription, 
didacticism.53 This is why Leavis speaks of “the profound exploration of 
moral feeling enacted in [Anna Karenina]”54 (AK, p. 21; my emphasis).
The creative imagination is really creative; it doesn’t stage the ethi-
cal, but allows it to emerge from the artistic fabric. The morality is in 
the novel, not in the novelist: “Never trust the artist. Trust the tale,” 
writes Lawrence (SCAL, p. 8). This is perhaps clarifying further what 
Wittgenstein means by “What expresses itself in language, we cannot 
express by means of language” (TLP 4.121).
And so the important things don’t get expressed by our saying them; 
it is when language is used to tell stories that the important things get 
expressed. In a letter to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein writes, “I once 
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tried to read Resurrection but couldn’t. You see, when Tolstoy just tells 
a story he impresses me infinitely more than when he addresses the 
reader. When he turns his back to the reader then he seems to me 
most impressive. . . . It seems to me his philosophy is most true when 
it’s latent in the story.”55
For both Leavis and Wittgenstein, the important things that a work 
of literature transmits are enacted, and they are immediately perceived. 
But what of those who don’t perceive or who perceive differently?
VII
[D]oes the game end with one person 
relishing what another does not?
—Ludwig Wittgenstein (PI, p. 228)
Here, I would say, with Peter Winch, that certain reactions would be 
inadequate, unacceptable; even—in extreme cases—unintelligible. In 
“Text and Context,” Winch writes, “what responses are possible, con-
ceivable, is internally related to the work responded to. Suppose, for 
example, that somebody were to say he found Bach’s St. Matthew Passion 
funny and laughed at it in the same way as he laughs at Rossini’s Barber 
of Seville. Would that be intelligible? Does it even make sense to speak of 
‘laughing at’ the Matthew Passion?”56 Of course, this is an extreme case, 
but it is the same for less extreme ones, such as the enactment we just 
witnessed between the schoolboy and his master. And indeed, the same 
goes for our reactions to emotion in a face. There is no misunderstanding 
some expressions: to react to someone’s frowning as he is being pricked 
by a needle as if it expressed great joy is not a case of misunderstanding 
but of something in the realm of pathology (dyssemia).
However, although the presentation may be perspicuous, not all read-
ers are properly attentive, or have the experience or psychology required 
to grasp subtle configurations. Attention, however, can be guided. This 
is the task of the literary critic57 who, as Leavis explains, takes the less 
attentive reader closely through the text to get her to grasp what she 
had not grasped:
Though the validity of a total inclusive judgment of a poem cannot be 
demonstrated, it is always possible in criticism to get beyond the mere 
assertion [or judgment]. . . . [T]he critic, with his finger moving from 
this to that point in the text, aims at so ordering his particular judgments 
(“This is so, isn’t it?”) that, “Yes” . . . almost inevitably comes for answer, 
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the rightness of the inclusive main judgment stands clear for the prompted 
recognition. . . . (LP, pp. 35–36)
And here I would suggest that this kind of instruction in perspicacity is 
a grammatical instruction (in the Wittgensteinian sense of “grammar,” 
which denotes the conditions for the meaningful use of words, where 
those conditions include the Menschenkenntnis conveyed by language58). 
The critic’s guidance is grammatical or conceptual in that it concerns 
the use of words to produce meaning: “Do you see how he is using that 
word here? Or placing that sigh? In such a context, this is what the word, 
the sigh means.” Of course, there may be rebuttal (“Yes, but . . .”), and 
yet, as Leavis says, the prompted recognition almost inevitably comes. 
What the reader is being taught here is not to decide for her- or himself 
whether the work enacts a particular meaning, but to recognize that it 
does, and how it does it; to recognize the grammar of meaning: how 
words and other modes of communication or expression are used to 
evoke or produce that meaning. So judgment here is far from a merely 
subjective affair.
Leavis’s “This is so, isn’t it?” simply and potently transmits the blend 
of objectivity and subjectivity peculiar to aesthetic judgment. “This is 
so—isn’t it?” There is in that phrase something imperative, and then 
a softening of the imperative in its appeal for agreement. This finely 
dovetails with Kant’s view of aesthetic judgment. For Kant, the peculiar-
ity of an aesthetic judgment is that, despite being radically subjective 
(in that no one can make such a judgment for you), and not strictly 
objective (in that there is no law or concept that can be appealed to 
justify it), the judgment is nevertheless entitled to universal assent59 and 
validity. The person making the judgment is, as Kant says, “a suitor 
for agreement”; he is entitled to expect agreement from anyone who 
approaches the object disinterestedly and properly attentive to its form. 
Leavis, probably unawares, echoes Kant: first, in the blend of subjectiv-
ity and objectivity: “A judgment is personal or it is nothing; you cannot 
take over someone else’s. The implicit form of a judgment is: This is 
so, isn’t it? The question is an appeal for confirmation that the thing is 
so. . . .”60 Because an aesthetic reaction is subjective—but not merely—
and objective—but not strictly—Kant calls it “intersubjective.” And this 
intersubjectivity also calls to mind Leavis’s “third realm”: “the realm of 
what is neither public in the sense belonging to science . . . nor merely 
private and personal” (NSMS, p. 98).
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Both Kant and Leavis entreat us to distinguish judgments of aesthetic 
taste from judgments of ordinary taste—preferring Keats to Swinburne 
is not like preferring apples to oranges. The significance of a work of 
art, as Hume also saw, is not in the eye of the beholder; it is in the 
work—isn’t it? All the critic can do is help us see what is indubitably 
there. As Leavis writes, “one can’t prove the rightness of . . . [literary] 
judgements; the mode of verification that goes with this order of thought 
isn’t proof, and certainly yields no finality. But it is characteristic of the 
most important convictions one forms to admit of nothing like proof” 
(CAP, p. 204). There is no proof; and yet the text contains “imponder-
able evidence,” which yields certitude—of the kind I was looking for, 
and found in both Wittgenstein and Leavis. What the critic does, then, 
is give, not arguments or proofs, but what Wittgenstein calls “further 
descriptions,” which are in fact grammatical elucidations. Here is G. E. 
Moore reporting Wittgenstein’s words:
What Aesthetics tries to do, [Wittgenstein] said, is to give reasons, e.g., 
for having this word rather than that in a particular place in a poem, or 
for having this musical phrase rather than that in a particular place in a 
piece of music. . . . He said that if, by giving “reasons” of this sort, you 
make another person “see what you see” but it still “doesn’t appeal to 
him,” that is “an end” of the discussion. . . .61
What “further descriptions”62 do is retrospectively flesh out the route 
of immediate understanding—as I very briefly did in my gloss of the 
Anna Karenina passage earlier.
VIII
Lawrence’s view of the novel’s inherent and organic interrelatedness 
is a refined way of saying that the novel is a story, or what Amelie Rorty 
calls a “structured representation”: “While there is sorrow, grief, loss, 
pain in life, there is tragedy only when the actions and events that com-
pose a life are organized into a story, a structured representation of that 
life.”63 Similarly, in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein notes, “Shakespeare 
displays the dance of human passions, one might say. Hence he has 
to be objective; otherwise he would not so much display the dance of 
human passions—as talk about it. But he displays it to us in a dance, 
not naturalistically” (CV, pp. 36–37). This takes us back to his idea that 
a work of art forces us “to see [something] in the right perspective but, 
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in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any 
other” (CV, p. 4). And in the Investigations, he asks, “Mustn’t someone 
who is painting be painting something—and someone who is painting 
something be painting something real? —Well, tell me what the object 
of painting is: the picture of the man (for example), or the man whom 
the picture portrays?” (PI, p. 149).
In art, the answer must be: it is the picture of the man we care about. 
For the picture is a structured presentation of reality, a presentation 
through an artistic medium, which impacts us in a way life alone can-
not do. Indeed, Leavis speaks of the creative imagination as enabling 
us to see in a gesture or an event, possibilities or “potentialities of 
human experience” (CAP, p. 118). Imagination deploys itself as a kind 
of attention or attentiveness to an aspect of things we had not been 
attentive to. To Rorty’s “structured representation,” Lawrence’s “subtle 
interrelatedness,” and Leavis’s “dramatic presentment,” I have added 
Wittgenstein’s “perspicuous presentation,” because it too is a presenta-
tion that structures or arranges what is always before our eyes in such 
a way as to make it perspicuous. But isn’t this what philosophy does? 
Yes, but not in the same way.
As we have seen, both Wittgenstein and Leavis believe that the impor-
tant things (of which, of course, ethical understanding is one) cannot 
be expressed propositionally—it takes a context or a story to present 
them perspicuously. I, on the other hand, would not want to deny 
ethics a voice; that is, a propositional or philosophical voice. I would 
uphold the value for ethics of “the stating use,” and do so elsewhere at 
length.64 Where I believe the superiority of literature lies is in depict-
ing or presenting, or showing (through enactment) the “imponder-
able evidence”—as Wittgenstein calls is—that importantly informs our 
ethical and emotional understanding. Moral principles and rules are 
essential to moral understanding, but they are not sufficient to provide 
the nuanced and direct acquaintance and apprehension necessary for 
a more perceptive and sensitive—and therefore a full-fledged—moral 
understanding.65
Literary perspicuous presentations differ from philosophical ones 
in that they can stage the vital contextualization, embeddedness, and 
interrelatedness of human meaning. Where the philosopher must slice 
through, and deal with, parts, the creative writer gives us the play and 
possible implications of a concept, like jealousy, in a full human con-
text—and a structured one at that. And so where the philosopher can 
make a conceptual analysis of human passions, it takes a creative writer 
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to present them, as Shakespeare does, in a dance. This means that 
literature can produce conceptual understanding in a way philosophy 
cannot—nondiscursively: through the blood, rather than the mind. “A 
poet’s words can pierce us” (Z §155), in a way a philosopher’s cannot.
A literary work interrogates and pushes the limits of our ordinary 
conceptual vocabulary; that it does so “in a dance”—in a perspicuous 
presentation whose descriptions look much more alive than the “descrip-
tions” of philosophy—does not make this less of a conceptual achieve-
ment. Literature’s descriptions are such that we cannot disagree with 
them if we want to make sense; they are not truth-valuable statements. 
And so literature also operates, though in its own way, at the level of 
grammar rather than judgment: through its imaginative arrangement 
of things, it helps us—not judge that this is jealousy or passion or bore-
dom, for no judgment is necessary for that—but refine or extend our 
concepts of jealousy, passion, or boredom; that is, their grammars. It 
enables us to better grasp the sense in which a human being may be 
said to be bored or ambitious.
In doing this, it of course enhances our understanding of ourselves; for, 
our grammar—as we saw—is rooted in our lives.66 Literature, I suggest, 
incomparably contributes to the formation of our concepts, and therefore 
to the formation of our selves. This might make it seem as if literature is 
only about concepts. Well, in a way, this is in keeping with how we speak 
about literary works: Romeo and Juliet is about love; Othello about jealousy; 
Madame Bovary about ennui; Macbeth about ambition. But of course these 
are mere crude shortcuts: there is no question of seeing literature as in 
the business of enacting individual concepts, but of literature as elucidat-
ing, extending, and enriching our concepts through enactment.
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